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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
-·-
JESSUP THOMAS and IRENE THOMAS, his 
wife; WILLIAM H. VAN TASSELL and 
DAPHNE VAN TASSELL, his wife; ORVEN 
J. MOON and DELPHIA N. MOON, his wife; 
and EDWIN CARMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KARL V. KING, as Administrator of the Estate 
of HANNAH J. BAFFET, Deceased; DALLAS 
H. YOUNG, Jr., as Administrator with the will 
annexed of the Estate of JOHN MAXCY 
ZANE, deceased; THE CONTINENTAL BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
as Administrator of the Estate of DAVID G. 
SMITH, deceased; JUANITA G. SMITH, sur-
viving wife of DAVID G. SMITH, deceased; 
HELEN B. MOTT; L. L. PACK and NORA E. 
PACK, his wife; W. H. COLTHARP and ORAL 
COLTHARP, his wife; 
Defendants, Intervenors and Respondents. 




GEORGE B. STANLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE Of UTAH 
JESSUP THOMAS and IRENE THOMAS, his 
wife; WILLIAM H. VAN TASSELL and 
DAPHNE VAN TASSELL, his wife; ORVEN 
J. MOON and DELPHIA N. MOON, his wife; 
and EDWIN CARMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KARL V. KING, as Administrator of the Estate 
of HANNAH J. BAFFET, Deceased; DALLAS 
H. YOUNG, Jr., as Administrator with the will 
annexed of the Estate of JOHN MAXCY 
ZANE, deceased; THE CONTINENTAL BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
as Administrator of the Estate of DAVID G. 
SMITH, deceased; JUANITA G. SMITH, sur-
viving wife of DAVID G. SMITH, deceased; 
HELEN B. MOTT; L. L. PACK and NORA E. 
PACK, his wife; W. H. COLTHARP and ORAL 
COLTHARP, his wife; 
Defendants, Intervenors and Respondents. 




In order to take away any chance for confusion, the 
caption of the action has been amended to cover the actual 
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appellants and respondents who are now before the court in 
this appeal. All other parties who were previously named 
in the caption of the action in the court below and who are 
not interested in this appeal have been omitted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. 
PARTIES. 
The plaintiffs in the court below and appellants herein 
are the following: Jessup Thomas and Irene Thomas, his 
wife, William H. Van Tassell and Daphne Van Tassell, his 
wife, Orven J. Moon and Delphia N. Moon, his wife, and 
Edwin Carman. In this brief, these parties shall be design-
ated, for the purpose of brevity and clarity, the plaintiffs. 
The defendants in the court below and who are respon-
dents herein, are the following: 
1. The Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt 
Lake City, Administrator of the Estate of David G. Smith, 
Deceased, Jaunita C. Smith, surviving widow of David G. 
Smith, Deceased; Helen B. Mott; L. L. Pack and Nora E. 
Pack, his wife; and W. H. Coltharp and Oral Coltharp, his 
wife; all of whom claim under the same title, and these 
parties will be designated as the Smith defendants for 
brevity and clarity. 
2. Karl V. King, administrator of the estate of Hannah 
J. Braffet, deceased, who claims the same interest as the 
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above Smith defendants, and is in default in the action, who 
will be called the Braffet defendants. 
3. Dallas H. Young, Jr., Administrator with the will 
annexed of the Estate of John Maxcy Zane, sometimes 
known as John M. Zane, Deceased. This interest will be 
called the Zane defendants. 
B. 
PLEADIN-GS. 
The pleadings which are pertinent to this appeal are 
as follows: 
1. Complaint filed June 25th, 1952, alleging a short 
form to quiet title against the Smith interests, the heirs of 
Mark P. Braffet and Hannah Braffet, both deceased, the 
heirs of John M. Zane, deceased, and others. (Rec. 1-5) 
2. Answer of David G. Smith and Juanita C. Smith, 
his wife; Helen B. Mott; L. L. Pack and Nora E. Pack, his 
wife; W. H. Coltharp and Oral Coltharp, his wife. This 
answer makes certain general admissions and denials as to 
the allegations of the complaint and nothing else. There 
are no affirmative allegations. There is no claim that the 
defendants or either or any of them own any interest in 
the lands involved in the action, or that they are entitled to 
the possession of the same. There is no , counterclaim. 
There is a prayer that "these defendants' title and owner-
ship in an undivided one-third (1/3) interest in the real 
property described in the complaint be quieted in ~hese 
defendants" but there is no allegation of any _nature to 
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support such a prayer. This answer was filed March 21st, 
1953. Said answer was signed by Dallas H. Young, Young, 
Young & Sorensen, Attorneys for said defendants. (Record 
14-16) 
3. Order Authorizing Joinder of Additional Parties, 
filed March 21st, 1953, joining The Carter Oil Company, 
Edwin Carman, Irene Thomas, Daphne Van Tassell and 
DelphiaN. Moon as parties. (Record 22-23) 
4. Reply of the Carter Oil Company, to the answer 
of the Smith interests setting up the bar of the Statute of 
Limitations as contained in Section 78-12-6, U.C.A. 1953, 
and the provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, and 
claiming an Oil and Gas Lease under Jessup Thomas and 
Irene Thomas, his wife, plaintiffs, herein. This was filed 
May 7th, 1953. Said Answer denies any title in the de-
fendants and sets forth many matters not in issue here. 
(Record 32-36) 
5. Order dismissing the action as to all defendants 
excepting David G. Smith and Juanita C. Smith, his wife; 
Helen B. Mott; L. L. Pack and Nora E. Pack, his wife; 
and W. H. Coltharp and Oral Coltharp, his wife. Filed 
September 14, 1953. The dismissal is without prejudice. 
(Record 52) . 
6. ORDER SUBSTITUTING A REPRESENTATIVE 
FOR DAVID G. SMITH, DECEASED, filed March 26th, 
1954. The Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt 
Lake City was substituted for the defendant, David G. 
Smith. (Record 74). 
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7. ANSWER OF INTERVENOR, filed April 27, 1954, 
wherein Karl. V. King, Administrator of the Estate of 
Hannah J. Braffet, .D.eceased, _in_ his first defense, makes 
general admissions and denials of the rna tters alleged -in 
the complaint. Said answer. further alleges that ~'at the 
time of the death of said Hannah J. Braffet, she had an 
undivided interest in the real estate described in the com-
plaint and that upon her death her interest descended 
to her heirs subject to being probated." Said answer prays 
that the "undivided interest in the real property described 
in the complaint, as her interest may appear, be quieted in 
the intervenor." Said answer is signed by Dallas H. Young, 
attorney for Administrator of the Estate ·of Hannah J. 
Braffet, deceased. 
As a second defense the answer alleges the civil action 
No. 2263 in the same court, setting forth the names of the 
plaintiffs and defendants. Jessup Thomas is not listed as 
a plaintiff, and Hannah J. Braffet, her legal representative, 
or anyone connected with her is not listed as a defendant. 
Neither are The Carter Oil Company, Edwin Carman, Irene 
Thomas, Daphne Van Tassell and Delphia N. Moon listed 
as parties, these parties having been made parties on March 
21st, 1953, before the filing of the answer. The following 
named persons were made parties to this present action 
who were not made parties to the said civil action No. 2263, 
namely: Jane Doe Miller, the wife of C. E. Miller; Jane Doe 
Stenger, the wife of Ernest Stenger; Minnie Barboglio, the 
wife of Peter Barboglio; R. J. Turner and Gertrude Ella 
Turner, his wife; J. R. Sharp; and Duchesne ·county. 
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Further continuing as a second defense, said answer 
sets up the present action and alleges the names of the 
plaintiffs and the defendants therein, omitting, however, 
the names of The Carter Oil Company, Edwin Carman, 
Irene Thomas, Daphne Van Tassell and Delphia N. Moon, 
who had been made parties previously to the filing of the 
answer, and prior to the dismissal alleged. The answer 
further sets up that the actions were voluntarily dismissed 
by the plaintiffs, and that the two dismissals operated "as 
an adjudication upon the merits and under Rule 41 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
No mention is made in this answer of Civil Action No. 
2693. (Record 77-81) 
No counterclaim was filed by this defendant. 
8. AMENDED ANSWER OF INTERVENOR, filed 
April 27th, 1954, wherein Dallas H. Young Jr., Administrat-
or with the will annexed of the estate of John Maxcy Zane, 
deceased, in his first defense, makes general admissions and 
denials of the matters alleged in the complaint. Said 
answer further alleges "that at the time of the death of 
the said John M. Zane, he had an undivided 1/6 interest 
in the real estate described in the complaint and that upon 
his death his interest descended to his heirs subject to 
being probated." 
The same defenses are set up in the second cause of 
action as are set up in No. 7 last above. Other than the 
fact that John M. Zane was made a party defendant in 
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Civil Action No. 2263, the same differences in parties exist. 
The same issue is set forth as is raised in paragraph 7 
above. The answer is signed by Dallas H. Young as attor-
ney for said administrator. No counterclaim was filed by 
this defendant. (Record 82-86) 
9. REPLY BY PLAINTIFFS AND BY DEFENDANT, 
THE CARTER OIL COMPANY, TO ANSWER OF 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, filed April 
27th, 1954, making general admissions and denials, and 
setting up the Statute of Limitations, particul~rly 78-12~6, 
U. C. A. 1953, and Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951. 
(Record 87) 
10. Decree Quieting Title, filed September 13th, 1954, 
wherein an undivided 1j3 interest in the lands described in 
the complaint was quieted in the Smith defendants, 1/6 
in the Zane defendants, and 2/9 in the Braffet defendants. 
The Smith and the Braffet interests are the same, and the 
1j3 in litigation was quieted to cover 5/9 undivided interest. 
The Smith and Braffet defendants are adverse to each 
other. (Record 104-106) 
11. ORDER OPENING AND WITHDRAWING 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE, AND ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL, 
filed December 13th, 1954. This was granted mainly on 
the double interest quieted in the original decree. (Record 
113.) 
12. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL. Dallas H. 
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Young withdraws as counsel for Karl V. King, Administrator 
of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased. (Record 114) 
13. NOTICE TO APPEAR BY COUNSEL OR PER-
SONALLY, filed February 17th, 1955, wherein Karl V. 
King, Administrator, is given notice to appear. (Record 
116). The default of Karl V. King, Administrator as afore-
said, was entered March 16th, 1955. (Record 124.) 
14. REPLY OF PLAINTIFFS AND ADDED PART-
IES TO ANSWER, filed April 25th, 1955. This reply makes 
general denials and admissions, and sets up limitations set 
forth in Section 78-12-6, U.C.A. 1953, and the provisions of 
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951. This affects the Smith 
interests. 
15. REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF INTER-
VENOR. Plaintiffs and added parties make general de-
nials and admissions, and set up limitations of Section 
78-12-6, U.C.A. 1953, and the provisions of Chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah, 1951. This affects the Zane interests. 
16. STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF ACTION 
AS TO DEFENDANT THE CARTER OIL COMPANY, 
filed November 28th, 1955. 
The issues tried and which are pertinent to this appeal 
under the pleadings were the following: 
a. Plaintiffs claim under a tax title. 
b. Plaintiffs and added parties claimed that the var-
ious defendants, Smith, Braffet and Zane defendants, were 
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barred from interposing their various answers by the pro-
visions of Section 78-12-6, U. C. A. 1953, and the provisions 
of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951. 
c. The Smith defendants claimed that while the statute 
might be effective at the time of the commencement of this 
action, the statute was tolled by the filing by the plaintiffs 
of civil action No. 2693, and by the filing of the answer by 
the said defendants in civil action No. 2693. 
d. The Smith and Zane defendants claimed that the 
tax proceedings were invalid because there was no auditor's 
affidavit affixed to the assessment rolls for the year 1929. 
(Transcript 9). 
e. The Zane defendants claimed that the dismissals by 
order of the court in Civil Actions 2263, 2693 and in the 
present action constituted dismissals on the merits under 
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
No claim was made by the defendants or any of them 
that the deed to the County, and the deed from the county 
to Jessup Thomas were not valid of their face or that the 
deeds were not made by the proper governmental authority. 
There was some evidence introduced to show possess-
ion by the plaintiffs, (Record 133-4), but the issue was 
disposed of by the court and the case decided on the issue 
of the Auditor's Tax Deed given May 19th, 1936, and as to 
plaintiffs further claim, that defendants are barred by the 
statute of limitations. (Record 133-4) 
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c. 
EVIDENCE. 
Except as to the testimony regarding possession, which 
is not in issue on this appeal, all of the testimony offered 
by both plaintiffs and defendants was documentary. The 
plaintiffs introduced the following evidence. 
EXHIBIT A: A certified photographic copy of the 
Tax Sale Record showing the tax sale of the property in-
volved in this action on Line 5 of Page 56, Sale No. 665, 
which certification was made by Dorothea W. Allred, 
County Recorder of Duchesne County, State of Utah, under 
date of March 15th, 1954. No objection was made to this 
exhibit by defendants (Transcript 7). 
EXHIBIT B: Certified photographic copy of the re-
cord in the office of the County Recorder of Duchesne 
County, Utah, of the Auditor's Tax Deed of the property 
involved in this action, made to Duchesne County, Utah. 
No objection was made to this exhibit by defendants (Tran-
script 7). 
EXHIBIT C: Abstract of title No. 3002, prepared by 
Stanley Title Company, final certificate dated January 20th, 
1953, at 9:00 o'clock A. M., showing the title up to the date 
of certification of the lands involved in this action. No 
objection was made by defendants to this exhibit (Tran-
script 7). 
EXHIBIT D: Statement of the assessment and pay-
ment of taxes on the property involved in the action from 
10 
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1937 to 1954, inclusive, certified to by ·Leland Wright, 
Treasurer, Duchesne . County, Utah under date of April 
25th, 1955. Objection was made by defendants to this ex-
hibit but the objection was withdrawn. (Transcript 7.) 
EXHIBIT E: Photographic copy of minutes of the 
Fourth Judicial District ·Court, Duchesne County, State of 
Utah, for June 23, 1952, showing that Dallas H. Young 
made no objection to the dismissal of civil action No. 2693, 
on behalf of the defendants he represented. 
The defendants introduced the following evidence: 
Civil file No. 2263, in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, County of Duchesne, wherein William 
H. Van Tassell, et al., were plaintiffs, and Mark P. Braffet, 
et. al., were defendants, was offered in evidence by de-
fendants, and over the objection of the plaintiffs, the file 
was rceived in evidence (Transcript 10.) 
Civil file No. 2693 was offered in evidence by the de-
fendants to which to the plaintiffs objected as follows: "We 
object to the introduction of the exhibit on the grounds that 
it is not within the issues of the case. There is no pleading 
to warrant the introduction of this file in evidence and we 
object further on the grounds that this is an attempt to 
set aside a valid order of this Court, the order being one 
dismissing the action without prejudice which was duly 
signed by Judge Tuckett and therefore the introduction 
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The only other evidence introduced by defendants \~vas 
by stipulation that there was no auditor's affidavit attached 
to the assessment rolls for the year 1929. No other evi-
dence attacking the Auditor's Tax Deed or the validity 
thereof was presented, and no other irregularities claimed. 
(Transcript 9.) 
It is interesting to note that all of the plaintiffs were 
present in court but that none of the defendants were 
present. (Record 172 and 184) . 
It is to be noted further that no evidence was intro-
duced by the defendants or either or any of them that they 
had ever been in possession of the lands described in the 
complaint. 
The plaintiffs claim error in the admission of Civil files 
Nos. 2263 and 2693 into evidence over the objections stated 
at pages 9, 10 and 11 of the transcript. 
There is no evidence in the case to alter or amend any 
instrument in writing and nothing to vary the instruments 
as they appear on file. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
POINT I. 
Conclusion of Law No. 1 is contrary to and not sup-
ported by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence on 
file, and the law, the defendants named therein being 
barred from asserting any claim to the ~ands involved in 
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POINT II. 
Conclusion of Law No. 2 is contrary to and not sup~ 
ported by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence 
on file, and the law, the defendants in said conclusion fail-
ing to raise any issue of the tolling of the statute by appro-
priate pleadings, and the evidence showing that the statute 
was not tolled by former actions. 
POINT III. 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 5 and 7 are contrary to 
and not supported by the findings of fact and documentary 
evidence on file, and the law, the defendants named therein 
failing to make any pleadings upon which such conclusions 
can be made. 
POINT IV. 
Conclusion of Law No. 4 is contrary to and not sup-
ported by the· findings of fact, the documentary evidence 
on file, and the law, and the record shows that the defend-
ants named therein did not at any time have the interest 
awarded to them in said conclusion. 
POINT V. 
Conclusion of Law No. 6 is contrary to and not sup-
ported by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence 
on file, and the law. 
POINT VI. 
The Amended Decree is contrary to and not supported 
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by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence on file, 
and the law. 
POINT VIT. 
From the findings of fact, the documentary evidence 
on file, and the law, the plaintiffs and appellants are entitled 
to a decree quieting their title as against all of the answer-
in defendants and all of the respondents. 
ARGUMENT. 
As a preliminary statement to the argument, the find-
ings of fact shown in the record are accepted in their entire-
ty by the plaintiffs as correct findings except that the 
plaintiffs object to the admissibility of the civil files Nos. 
2263 and 2693 from which findings of fact Nos. IX and X, 
shown at pages 178 and 179 of the record, were made. The 
appeal is made on the basis that the conclusions of law 
made upon the findings of fact are not in accordance with 
the facts and the law, and that the Amended Decree shown 
at pages 183 to 185 of the record, upon the facts and the 
law, should be reversed and the title to the property involv-
ed quieted in the plaintiffs as against the var~ous defend-
ants. 
POINT I. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO 1 IS CONTRARY TO 
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF F ACf, 
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE 
LAW, THE DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN BEING 
BARRED FROM ASSERTING ANY CLAIM TO THE 
14 
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LANDS INVOLVED IN· THE ACTION BY THE PROVIS-
IONS OF CHAPTER 19, ·LAWS OF UTAH, 1951. 
The lower Court in his decision (Record 138) . finds 
that Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, is a validly enacted 
statute and states the law applicable in this case. The de-
cision then goes to the effect that as to the Smith interests, 
the filing of the prior actions tolled the statute as to the 
. . . 
S~ith interests. The court further decided that the pribr 
dismissals of former acions was an adjudication on the 
merits under rule 41A. As to the tolling of the statute and 
.. 
the effect of the rule 41A, these mattE~rs will be discussed 
later. 
It therefore goes without saying that the limitations 
are effective unless so tolled or made inoperative by prior 
actions. 
r Subject to the above exceptions or matters in avoid-
ance, the present case is exactly in point with the case .of 
Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884, 3 Utah 2d 310. "No claim 
is made that the deed was not valid on its face or that it 
was not issued by the proper governmental authority." In 
the light of the decision in this quoted case, Findings of 
Fact Nos. VI, VII and VIII are immaterial. (Record 177.) 
There is no finding of fact that the plaintiffs or either or 
any of them had ever beeri in possession of the lands involv-
ed in the action. 
This action was commenced by the filing of the com-
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plaint on June 25th, 1952. Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, 
took effect on May 8th, 1951, with a provision that it would 
not become effective for one year. It became fully effective 
on May 8th, 1952 as to all parties. 
Finding of Fact V(6) finds the Auditor's Tax Deed 
upon which plaintiffs rely was dated April lOth, 1936, re-
corded May 19th, 1936, in Book "5" of Auditor's Tax Deeds, 
page 506, as Entry No. 57393 of the records of Duchesne 
County, Utah. (Record 176) There is no finding that the 
deed is void on its face, or otherwise. Subject to the mat-
ters above mentioned, the record and the findings of fact 
show that the plaintiffs have established their claim to title. 
POINT II. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 IS CONTRARY TO 
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE 
LAW, THE DEFENDANTS IN SAID CONCLUSION FAIL-
ING TO RAISE ANY ISSUE OF THE TOLLING OF THE 
STATUTE BY APPROPRIATE PLEADINGS, AND THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE STATUTE WAS NOT 
TOLLED BY FORMER ACTIONS. 
This point goes to the Smith interests only. 
We have the same situation here as existed in the case 
of Hansen v. Morris, supra. There is no limitation running 
against the plaintiffs. The limitation is running against 
the defendants. In the last mentioned case, this Supreme 
Court holds that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead 
16 
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the statute of limitations running jn favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant. It is· necessary for the. defendant 
agai:nst ~h<?,~·~th~ sta~tlt~.i~ ru~ning to ple~d.special matters 
•• • • • • • J "' • • ' • • "'· • • ~· • • 
·in avoidance· of·~~~· :statute of limitations which has run 
against him .. · .... · : · · 
'.; .• '·',I' 
Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civili:Procedure, pro-
yiqe,s .as follows: 
."(c) AfFI~MATIVE DEFENSES. In plead-
ing to .a preceding.~ pleading~ a party shall set forth 
. affirmatively accord; arid satisfactio;n, arbitration 
· and award,. assumpt~on of risk, e~:n1trlhutory neg-
ligence, discharge. in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
: J~ilure of consideratiol}., fraud, ~llegality, injury 
' by fellow . servant, .lac4es, license·, pa,.yment, re-
"lease, res ju~icata, ::~tattJte· of. frauds,' statute of 
limitations, waiver,. and other mc;ltter constituting 
an avoidance or. affirmative defense."· (Emphasis 
added.) 
.,;·:'J 
·.·... Th~ answer of the· Smith defendants ·.··(Record 14~16) 
alleges nothing with respect to' the speciaJ matters in avoid-
ance of the statute of limitittions set forth 'in Conclusion of 
Law No.2, namely the tolling of the statute by the filing of 
Civil A;ctlon Nos. 2693 and 2764. (Record 14-16). Plaintiffs 
think this is fatal. No issue was raised··. Without proper 
pleadings. Objection was made. bY. plainti~fs to. the intro-
ductiqn of the file in Civil . N_o. 2693 on the ~ery ground 
that there wer~ ~o .pleadings upon. which s~ch file could be 
introduced. (Transcript 10-11). 
In the case of Johanson v. Cudahy· Packing Co., 152 
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P.2d 98, 107 Utah 114, in a case involving the tolling of the 
statute of limitations, said: 
"The appellants contend that in view of the for-
mer action brought by plaintiffs the running of 
the statute of limitations was tolled by Section 
104-2-41, which section permits the plaintiff to 
commence a new action within one year after 
the former action (which involved the former 
appeal referred to above) failed otherwise than 
on its merits. But there is nothing on the face 
of this complaint to show that Section 104-2-41 
has been brought into play. From all that ap-
pears from the complaint this is the first time 
that any action has been commenced to recover 
for the wrongful death of Robert Johanson. We 
cannot judcially notice proceedings and records 
of a case previously determined. Robinson v. 
Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. 430; Spencer v. In-
dustrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618." 
While the position of the plaintiffs and defendants in 
this action is reversed, the same rule applies to the answer 
made by the defendants. We have a dearth of decisions 
regarding litigation wherein the plaintiff raises the statute 
of limitations. The general rule which was upheld in Jo-
hanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra, is best stated under 
Limitation of Actions in 54 C.J.S., page 594: 
e. Prior Action. 
As a general rule the party who relies on the dis-
missal or other termination of a prior action to 
bring a subsequent action within an exception 
extending the time for suing where a prior action 
was terminated under certain circumstances must, 
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by his allegations, show all that is essential to 
bring the case within the exception. 
See also 115 A. L. R., page 765, under III. Necessity of 
alleging matter in avoidance under the subdivision A, Gen-
eral Rule, which cites Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Devel-
opment Co., 269 P. 147 at page 152, 72 Utah, 137. The 
latter goes into some detail about the necessity of pleading 
specially to avoid limitations. 
Departing from the necessity of pleading the avoidance 
of the statute, we now turn to the proposition of whether or 
not the filing of the complaint in Civil Action No. 2693 and 
the answer filed therein by the Smith defendants (Record 
14-16) tolled the statute of limitations in favor of the Smith 
defendants so that the Statute of Limitations in said Chap-
er 19 does not apply herein. 
34 Am. Jur. 227, states as follows: 
"No. 281. DISMISSAL, DISCONTINUANCE, 
AND NONSUIT.-In the absence of statute, a 
party cannot deduct from the period of the stat-
ute of limitations applicable to his case the time 
consumed by the pendency of an action in which 
he sought to have the matter adjudicated, but 
which was dismissed without prejudice as to him, 
and if, before he commences a new action after 
having become nonsuited or having had his action 
abated or dismissed, the limitation runs, the right 
to a new action is barred. * * * * * In a number 
of jurisdictions, however, the statutes, in language 
that is by no means uniform, authorize the com-
mencement of a new action within a prescribed 
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period after a nonsuit or dismissal of a prior ac-
tion. Some of such statutes apply to both vol-
untary and involuntary dismissals." 
The above rule has universal application. In Utah, our 
Code has a chapter dealing with matters which toll the 
statute of limitations. This is article 3, of Chapter 12 of 
the Judicial Code, comprising sections 78-12-35 to 78-12-46, 
pages 152 to 164, of Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953. From the 
answer of the Smith defendants (Record 14-16) plaintiffs 
are at a loss to know which section is claimed to provide the 
tolling of the statute by the filing of civil action No. 2693, 
and the basis upon which Conclusion of Law No. 2 (Record 
11) concludes that such filing "tolled the statute of limita-
tions from July 27, 1951, until it was dismissed on June 
23, 1952." (Record 181). The only section upon which 
anyone could rely for tolling the statute would be Section 
78-12-40, U.C.A. 1953, which reads: 
"78-12-40. EFFECT OF F AlLURE OF ACTION 
NOT ON MERITS.-If any action is commenced 
within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited either 
by law or contract for commencing the same 
shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and 
the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure." 
This quoted section provides for the only way in which 
a new action may be brought after the statute of limitations 
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has run.· This section is for the· benefit of-~a PLAINTIFF 
and says nothing about a DEFENDANT. · In the present 
action, there is no statute running AGAINST the plaintiff 
which plaintiffs. are . setting up as being tolled by any prior 
action.. The statute of limitations relied on by plaintiffs is 
running in their favor and against the defendants. 
·· The defendants cannot claim the benefit of Section 
78-12-40. They are not plaintiffs and they .did not institute 
the actions, either No. 2693 or the present action. 
It may be argued that the defendants, as counter-
claimants, might claim the benefit of Section 78-12-40, __ pro-
viding that they can show that they filed ,a counter-clajm 
• t I :, .f 
within time. This they ce1:nnot do. 
In Civil Action 2693 admitted into evidence ·ove·r the 
plaintiffs' objection, the plain.tiffs filed a complaint)n the 
usual short form to quiet title. On Au~st 2()th,_ 19!?1, 
~ . I ' - ~ \_ • 
tQe Smith defendants filed an Answe.r. In this answer, the 
defendants made no claim of ownership of the lands involved 
in the action. The only claim of interest is stated as follows: 
"1. Admit that they claim- a right title and in-
terest in and to the property described in plaintiffs 
complaint which is adverse to the alleged claim 
of interest of the plaintiffs." 
The nature of this claim is not set forth as demanded 
in the plaintiffs' complaint. The right, title and interest 
which defendants claimed might have been' as a lien-holder, 
mortgagee, or any number of interests which would not be 
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possessory. This answer could in no-wise be denominated 
a counter-claim. Rule 8 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides as follows: 
"(a) CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which 
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party 
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgement 
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." 
The prayer in said answer prays "that defendants title 
be quieted in the property above described." There is 
nothing alleged in the answer which upon this relief can be 
granted. The defendants do not allege that they own any 
interest in the property described. Hence, this answer can 
not be treated as a counterclaim. 
On June 16th, 1952, the Smith defendants filed an 
"Amended Answer" in said Civil Action No. 2693. In this 
new amended answer, they set up a new counterclaim, 
alleging that "they are the owners in fee simple of a one-
third interest in all of the surface rights in the property 
described in the complaint, and of a five-eighteenths interest 
in all oil, gas and minerals under said premises." They 
also prayed that their title be quieted to these interests. 
On the face of the pleading it appears that a good cause 
of action was stated and the relief prayed for thereunder. 
However, there are factors which negative the effect-
iveness of this "Amended Answer." 
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·At the time of the filing of this. "Amended Answer" 
on. June. 16th, :·1952, the prov:isions of Chapter 19, Laws ot 
Utah,' .1951, W:er~, ·in Jull force and .effect. . .The limitation 
statute became effective on May 8th, 1951. More than one 
y~a.r had elapsed before the filing of this "Amended 
·.:;, ., .·.. .·. ,_ ·-; :···_: .... · .. , .' ., ·. ... .. 
1\llsw~r~'~ ... There was no. counterclaim or affirmative alle-
ga tiorrs made· 'in · the original answer. The affirmative 
a11~.~ations cons~ituted a new cause . ?f actions which was 
not set up in the(.original answer, wnerein the defendants 
set up ownership irt the ·property and prayed ·for a decree 
quieting their tftles. Under these· circurristarices, the statute 
of limitations continued to run against this new cause of 
a~tion stated by the ·defendants. See 127· A.L.R., 918. 
At' ·best, the Smith .defendants· cannot maintain the 
statement in Conclusion of Law No .. 2. (Record.,l81) which 
reads: 
"The filing by plaintiffs on June. 27, 1951 of Civil 
Action 2693·.and the filing of the answer by the 
defendants * * · * * * tolled the statute of limita-
tions from· July 27th, 1951, until it was dismissed 
on June 23, 1952." 
The case of Weiner vs. Stearns, et. al., 120 Pac. 490, 
40 Utah, l85, is directly. in point in .this regard. .. The plain-
tiff, . a tax title .. ho~?er, brought suit to quiet title. The 
defendant raised the statute of limitations. Two actions 
were involved, one of wihch was dismissed. · Qne of the 
questions iiivolv~ was whether or not the time consumed 
by the p.endency in. the dismissed action could .be deducted 
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from the full statutory time which had run until the com-
mencement of the second action. Regarding this question, 
the court said, commencing on page 495 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
''Nor does the statute cease to run, except 
for the purpose of the particular action, and, 
unless there is a special statute saving the right 
to bring a new action in case a pending action 
fails, or is dismissed otherwise than upon merits, 
no new action can be maintained if the statutory 
period of limitations had fully run, pending the 
action which had so failed or been dismissed. 
:)(: * * * * 
"The rule is clearly stated by the author of 
Wood on Limitation of Actions (section 272) in 
the following words: 'Although the adverse pos-
session of a defendants in ejectment cannot, dur-
ing the pendency of the suit, ripen into an 
absolute title under the operation of the statute 
of limitations, yet the effect of the statute is 
neutralized only in respect to the particular suit 
and the plaintiff therein. And, after the termina-
tion of that suit, the statutory limitation having 
meanwhile expired, no subsequent action can be 
brought, either at law or in equity, to question 
that title or possession; and if the plaintiff fails 
therein the period during which the action was 
pending is not deducted from the period requisite 
to gain a title by possession.' 
"This principle is frequently applied in our 
own courts. Suppose a cause of action accrues 
on a promissory note on one day, and an action 
is commenced to enforce payment thereof on the 
next day. Suppose, further, that the action re-
mains pending and undisposed of for the full 
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period of the statute of limitations, and then fails 
·or is dismissed otherwise than on merits. Would 
anyone contend that, in case another action was 
commenced on the same note, the defendant 
could not successfully a vail himself of the statute 
of limitations, in case the latter action was not 
commenced within a year from the time the first 
action failed, or was dismissed, as provided in 
Comp. Laws 1907, No. 2893 (now 78-12-40, U.C.A. 
1953)? And would anyone further contend that 
if it were not for that section the plaintiff, under 
the foregoing circumstances, could successfully 
maintain . a new action, in case the defendant 
plead the statute of limitations? It is manifest, 
therefore, that the commencement of an action, 
· although commenced against the adverse party, 
doest not arrest the running of statute, even as 
against such a party, except for the purpose of 
the particular ·proceeding that is pending." 
The holding in conclusion of law No. 2 is therefore in 
error. 
By way of emphasis, Section 78-12-40 is for the benefit 
of PLAINTIFFS. It cannot be relied upon by DEFEND-
ANTS. In the instant case, this is especially so. The 
Answer of the Smith defendants (Record 14-16) is a mere 
answer of admissions and denials, and does not set forth 
any counter-claim or affirmative allegations of any nature. 
It cannot be said to set forth an independent cause of action 
in any respect, although there is a plea that the title of the 
defendants be quieted. They have brought no "new action" 
which saves their "cause of action" which might have been 
stated in Civil Action No. 2693. 
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This very point is ruled on the case of Weiner v. 
Stearns, supra, as set forth on page 497 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"Where, however, as in the case here, the action 
is commenced by the party who subsequently 
pleads the bar, we cannot see how the statute of 
limitations can be arrested, as against him, by 
the bringing of an action.'' 
* * * * * 
"While it is true that Borg had disputed 
appellants's title to the property in his action 
commenced in January, 1907, yet that action was 
dismissed; and hence, under the rule to which 
we have hereinbefore referred, the statute con-
tinued to run against him until he made his sub-
sequent application in the following February." 
It is interesting to note in reviewing the facts of the 
case above quoted that the defendant commenced his count-
er action on January 29th, 1907, that said action was 
dismissed and on February 25, 1907, said defendant filed 
an application in the original action. The above quotation 
holds that the commencing of the action on January 29th, 
1907, did not toll the statute of limitations, and that the 
statute ran until February 25th, 1907. The benefits of 
Section 2893, Compiled Laws, 1907, now Section 78-12-40 
U.C.A. 1953, were not allowed to the defendant. They 
cannot be allowed to the defendants in this action. 
The present action was commenced on June 25th, 
1952 (Record 2764). The dismissal of civil action No. 
2693 took place on June 23rd, 1952 (see file)) pursuant to 
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the allegations in the Amended Answer of the Smith 
defendants (see file) , on motion of the plaintiffs, and 
without objection by Dallas H. Young, Attorney for all 
defendants, who was present at the hearing when the 
motion for dismissal was made (Plaintiffs' Exhibit E). 
In summary on Point II, the plaintiffs set forth: 
(1) There are no pleadings in the complaint (Record 
1-5) nor in the Answer of the Smith defendants (Record 
14-16) to show that any other action had been commenced 
on the same claim presented in this action, and the court 
cannot take judicial notice of the previous action No. 2693. 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 107 Utah 
114, supra. 
(2) It was error to allow the introduction of the file 
in Civil Action No. 2693 over the plaintiffs' objection 
(Transcript 10-11). 
(3) The statute of limitations set up in Chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah, 1951, was not tolled by the pendency of Civil 
Action No. 2693 only for that particular action, and upon 
the dismissal of that action, the statute had fully run against 
the defendants. 
(4) That at the time of the commencement of the 
present action, on June 25th, 1952, the provisions of Chap-
ter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, were fully effective as against 
the defendants, and they are barred from asserting any 
answer, counterclaim or other claim for relief in this Civil 
Action No. 2764. 
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POINT III. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 3, 5 and 7 ARE 
CONTRARY TO AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON 
FILE, AND THE LAW, THE DEFENDANTS NAMED 
THEREIN FAILING TO MAKE ANY PLEADINGS UPON 
WHICH SUCH CONCLUSIONS CAN BE MADE. 
Conclusions of Law 3, 5 and 7 involve the Zane defend-
ants. They are based upon the Amended Answer of the 
Intervenor (Record 82-86) and Findings of Fact IX, X and 
XI. (Record 178-180). 
The Amended Answer of Intervenor (Record 82-86) 
states in paragrah 6: 
"6. That the dismissal of these actions by the 
plaintiffs operated as an adjucations upon the 
merits and under Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 1953, this de-
fendant is entitled to a judgement of this Court 
quieting the title of the John M. Zane estate to 
an undivided one-sixth interest in the property 
above described." 
The Zane defendants do not claim that the statute of 
limitations was tolled as to them. Their sole claim is that 
the dismissals in the two former actions constituted an 
adjuication on the merits. The two former actions alleged 
are No. 2263, filed June 1st, 1946, and No. 2764 (the 
instant action), filed June 25th, 1952. Conclusion of Law 
3 (Record 181) finds that "Plaintiffs' dismissal of Civil 
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actions 2693 and 2764 as to the heirs of John M. Zane, 
deceased, opera ted as an adjuca tion of the claim stated in 
those actions upon the merits." 
There are two errors on the face of said conclusion of 
law No. 3. The Finding of Fact No. X (Record 179) finds 
with respect to Civil Action No. 2693: 
"On June 23, 1952, Judge R. L. Tuckett of 
this court, at the instance and request of plain-
tiffs, entered an order dismissing said action 
without prejudice for the reasons set forth in the 
Amended Answer of defendants and without ob-
jection by the attorneys for said defendants." 
The Finding of Fact No. XI (c) finds with respect to 
civil action No. 2764: 
" (c) Judge R. L. Tuckett of this court, at 
the instance and request of plaintiffs, entered an 
order dismissing this action as to all defendants 
excepting those who had answered in paragraph 
(b) last above, said order being filed September 
14, 1953, and said order being without prejudice." 
The first error is that the conclusion that PLAINTIFFS 
dismissed the actions. They were both dismissed by order 
of court. 
The second error is that the pleadings of the Zane 
defendants goes to the effect that the present action cannot 
be prosecuted by the plaintiffs because of the two dismissals 
in Civil Actions No. 2263 and 2764, and the conclusion of 
law is to the effect that said two disn1issals took place in 
Civil Actions No. 2693 and 2764. 
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In both the amended answer and in Conclusion of Law 
No. 3, Civil Action No. 2764 is the basis of the relief prayed 
for and obtained in this action which is now before this 
Supreme Court on appeal. The Zane defendants plead that 
the second dismissal in Civil Action No. 2764 amounted 
to a dismissal on the merits, and then the lower court gives 
them judegement in Civil Action No. 2764, on the ground 
that the action has been dismissed. It is true that Judge 
R. L. Tuckett dismissed Civil Action No. 2764 as to the 
Zane defendants on September 14th, 1953 (Record 52). 
It· is just as true that the Zane defendants filed 
an answer in intervention (Record 67-69) and 
an amended answer (Record 82-86.) This intervention on 
the part of the Zane defendants reinstated the action as to 
them, or in the alternative, the dismissal is still effective. 
They canriot have their cake and eat it too. Either there 
was no .second dismissal which was effective as to them, or 
they have no standing in this case. These defendants cannot 
voluntarily reinstate this action as to them, and then claim 
relief in the action on the ground that the action has been 
dismissed as to them. 
There are three actions which are involved in this 
phase ·of the case, and in each there is an order dismissing 
the action. They are as follows: 
No. 2263, filed May 22nd, 1946. The first Order of 
dismissal was signed by R. L. Tuckett on October lOth, 
1949, and filed November 3rd, 1949, dismissing the action 
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as to the Zane defendants. There was another Order of 
dismissal signed by JudgeR. L .. Tuckett completely dismiss-
ing the action on June 23rd, 1952. (Finding 9, Record 178) 
" 
No. 2693, filed July 27th, 1951. Judge R. L. Tuckett 
signed the Order of Dismissal on June 23rd, 1952, and it 
was filed the same day. (Finding 10, Record 178-9) 
No. 2764, the present action, was filed June 25th, 1952. 
There is an Order signed by JudgeR. L. Tuckett, dismissing 
this action as to all defendants except the Smith defendants, 
dated September 14th, 1953, filed September 14th, 1953. 
(Finding 11, Record 179). 
Each of the dismissals signed by Judge R. L. Tuckett 
is made without prejudice excepting the first one in Civil 
Action No. 2263. Nothing is said in No. 2263 in the Order 
dismissing the action as to the parties named therein as to 
whether it was made with or without prejudice. 
Further, there is not one Notice of Dismissal made 
without order of the court by the plaintiffs or either or any 
of them in any of the actions. 
In order to appreciate the stand taken by the Zane de-
fendants and upheld by the Lower Court, it is necessary to 
quote from one of the briefs of the defendant, filed in 
the Lower Court: 
"It is to be noted that there is no provision in the 
rules which allows the court to make an order 
of dismissal against a defendant who has not 
either answered or filed a motion for a summary 
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judgment. The only procedure for dismissing 
against such a defendant is contained in Rule 
41 (a) l." 
"The recitals in the orders of dismissal that the 
dismissals are without prejudice cannot be of 
significance. If it were otherwise, then the parties 
and the court may defeat the operation of the 
rules by placing something in the order of the 
court contrary to the provisions of the rules. As 
we have pointed out, the dismissals, if they are 
effective against the Zane and Braffet interests, 
must have been made pursuant to Rule 41 (a) 1." 
In the event that the judge does actually dismiss an 
action by order without prejudice prior to the filing of an 
answer or motion for summary judgment, what is its lega1 
·effect? Is it void because the court has no jurisdiction or 
because the court exceeds his jurisdiction? If such is the 
case, then the actions are still pending. No notices of dis-
missal have been filed or entered by the plaintiffs without 
order of the court. Plaintiffs have found no cases in point, 
and challenged the defendants to present such cases, which 
they have not done. 
Rule 41 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads as 
follows: 
"(a) VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT 
THEREOF. 
" ( 1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 23 (c) , of Rule 66, and 
of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) 
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
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service by the adverse party of an answer or of a 
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing 
a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim.'' 
'' (2) By Order of Court. Except as provided 
in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, 
an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by 
a defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not 
be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjuication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under 
this paragraph is without prejudice." 
Following the line of reasoning of the defendants, 
the various orders dismissing the three actions without 
prejudice, all signed by Judge R. L. Tuckett, and all being 
specifically without prejudice, are nullities. The fact that 
plaintiffs moved for these orders made them invalid, ac-
cording to defendants. The plaintiffs have never gone along 
with this reasoning although the lower court did. 
Each of the orders were made in open court and were 
regularly filed therein. They were not appealed from. 
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No motion has been made to set any of them aside, except 
~qr t~~ .. y~1Uf1ta~y: interpleadings_ made by· the Zane and 
Braffett defendants which interpleadings nullified the order 
of dismissal . in this action 2764 now before this Supreme 
¢ou.rt_,.jns~far as it pertains to the Zane ·and Braffet de-
fendants.· 
'· . 
, ... - . Furthermore, the reaso~ing of the defendants which 
has been sustained by the Lower Court, in effect says that 
th~ .provisions of Rule 41- (a) (1) are exclusive, that any 
dismissal made· either by plaintiff or on motion by plaintiff 
~o.llowed by an·· order of court, and made before answer 
or motion. for summary judgement is filed, comes under the 
purview . of said subdivision. Under this reasoning the 
. . 
col.lrt. has no jurisdiction to make an order dismissing an 
~~tion .. :\ritp.out prejudice until after an answer has been 
filed~or.a-motion for summary judgement is made. Further, 
·under this reasoning, the defendants virtually claim that all 
··:~ f ·~ .. :::·~.;·· I .. , ~~· • • ,. ': : • • •• 
of the Orders made by Judge R. L. Tuckett, are set aside 
by the Decree in this present case, and that said actions 
were riot. dismissed without prejudice but are now dismissed 
With prejudice. 
The J?laintiffs cannot go along with this reasoning. 
Rule ~1 (a) (~) states that the plaintiff "MAY" file a notice 
of dismissal of an action. He is not required to do so. 
' :1 I ,I 
There is nothing in the whole rule which deprives the 
judge of jurisdiction to make an order dismisSing an 
action before an answer is filed or a motion for summary 
judgement made. Plaintiffs claim that all of the orders 
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made by by Judge R. L. Tuckett are res adjudicata, and 
except for the interpleadings, are final orders which cannot 
be set aside by Judge Joseph E. Nelson in the Decree 
Quieting Title in this present action. The plaintiffs cannot 
be bound by Notices of Dismissal when they have filed none. 
In arguing this matter before the lower court and in 
briefs, plaintiffs urged that they could find no case any-
where that applied the two dismissal rule set up in sub-
division (1) of said Rule to an action which had been 
dismissed by order of the court. In answer to this ~ugges­
tion, defendants quoted from several cases, some of which 
are as follows: 
Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Company vs. Noma Elec-
tric Corporation, 10 Federal Rules Decisions at page 32, 
which in part said: 
"Plaintiff filed notice of dismissal of the present 
suit." 
Cleveland Trust Company vs. Osher and Reiss, 31 
Federal Supplement, page 985: 
"The purpose of the rule providing that dismissal 
is without prejudice, except that a notice of 
dismissal operates as an adjuica tion on the merits 
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed, 
is to prevent the delays and litigation by numerous 
dismissals without prejudice." 
Hineline vs. Minneapolis Honeywell Company, 78 Fed-
eral 2d, 854: 
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· · ·.~'The· cas·e was set for- trial and 1ater ·the plaintiff 
: .w~missed the case." 
·,!·Even. after inviting the defendants to quote one case in 
,·,(.·<; ,. • ·, '. ;• .. ', ' • r· •, . ,, o .... ,• 
·which the double-dismissal rule \vas held · to be effective 
after ~:idfsmissal l)'y order of the ~ourt plaintiffs f._~':~~ yc:t 
1<? ~e,ad.aJl:Y. ca~e _providing for the application of the rule 
~!-~r .tpe. action has bee~ dismi~sed. witnout .prejudice,_ ·by 
P.~~er .. :of. the court .. 
:;.: .·.AF'page 84''of.the'record,·the Zane·defehdants m'their 
Second Defense~ allege~the filing of Civil Action :No. 2263 
·ns·· ·being the~ first action which . was disrirlssed. ··This action 
was dismissed by Order of Judge R. L. Tuckett, insofar 
as! ;th~~ -Z~ne _def~ndants are .. .concerned, on _November 3rd, 
•. ' . .- • ~ ' I .-./". . ~ • ~. . . • • • • . • -
1.~~~~.· (See ._file) .. Tha~ was._ long before our present rules 
were adopted. The Note at the end of. Rule 41 (a) (1) 
states that the double dismissal feature was new matter. 
:Tliet~ior~~:~ civif .. 'Action 'No .. 2263 cannot be. _i.tsed here. 
When the Civil file No. 2263 was presented in evidence, 
{Transcript 10) ·objection was made to its admission by the 
plaintiffs on the following grounds: 
I ~I ' '• 
I .• \• 
' ' I ' ~ 
.. "on . the · grounds that the file is incompetent 
immaterial, and that the issues therein stated and 
stated in· the answer of Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
as· administrator of the estate with the will 
annexed· of the estate of John Macy Zane, de-
ceased, is. ~es Judicata and the action was dis-
missed by order of the Court and the order was 
. not. appealed from." ( Transcript 10). 
When the file in Civil Action No. 2693 was offered 
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in evidence by defendants (Transcript 10-11), objection 
was made by the plaintiffs as follows: 
"We object to the introduction of an exhibit on 
the grounds that it is not within the issues of the 
case. There is no pleading to warrant the intro-
duction of this file in evidence and we object 
further on the grounds that this is an attempt 
to set aside a valid order of this Court, the order 
being one dismissing the action without prejudice 
which was duly signed by Judge Tuckett and 
therefore the introduction of this is not within 
the issues of the case." 
Plaintiffs urge that both of the above objections were 
well taken. The orders of dismissal in both actions speak 
for themselves and make the issue res adjudicata. There 
are no pleadings in the Amended Answer of the Zane 
interests (Record 92-86) to warrant the introduction of the 
file in Civil Action No. 2693. 
The file in Civil Action No. 2263 discloses that it is 
not the same cause of action as set forth in civil actions 
Nos. 2693 and 2764. As set forth at ·page 5 of this brief, 
there were numerous parties who were either plaintiffs or 
were joined with them, who were not parties in No. 2263 
who were made parties in Nos. 2693 and 2764. Likewise, 
numerous defendants were brought into Nos. 2693 and 
2764 who were not parties in 2263. Therefore, the dismissal 
of No. 2263 could in no wise be construed as a dismissal of 
the same causes of action set forth in Nos. 2693 and 2764. 
Plaintiffs who were not parties therein could not dismiss 
No. 2263. Civil Action No. 2764 is the present action. It 
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cannot be used in connection with either 2263 or 2693 to 
show double-dismissal, inasmuch as·· the Zane·. defendants 
.:rely :on. the ·:continuation of Action Np. 2764 in order to 
obtain :any ·judgement~ 
. .r.; .. : The·defense of .the double dismissal made by the Zane 
·d~fendants is therefore untenable. The de·cree of the lower 
... ·.·:·:· . ·' 
court should.be reversed as to them. 
- . . . . . ~ . ~ 
~~ : :: . ' 
::~'.,. , ._find1ngs Qf. :Fact IX, X and XI, and the Orders of Dis-
... . . .. . ... ·: ... : ';. 
missal in civil actions Nos. 2263,2693 and 2764-show that 
all dismissals were made by order of court under Rule 
: . ~-. ; ... ·... . ·. . . 
41:- (a) (2). Plaintiffs believe that the rule means what it 
/ ••• :·. 'J' 
~~ys and t~at· any dismissal made by order of the court 
·is;, W,itho~t' 'predjudice unless otherwise stated in th~ order . 
. ,Pi~ktlffs fhrther belie~e that the rule requires that a 
::~lai~tiffi.:flle ~0 notices of dismissal without order· of the 
court to be bound by the two dismissal rule. The plaintiffs 
.• .. . . ••.'t"','i: .. . . 
have yet to file their first notice of dismissal without order 
-~lth~· cou~t. 
Plaintiffs have searched diligently to find a case which 
turns·on the point of that.a plaintiff is bound under the two 
dismissal rule when the former actions were dismissed by 
,~order .of the· court. We have found none, and therefore no 
authorities are quoted. 
POINT IV. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 4 IS CONTRARY TO 
AND NOT- SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
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THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE 
LAW, AND THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE DEFEND-
ANTS NAMED THEREIN DID NOT AT ANY TIME 
HAVE THE INTEREST AWARDED TO THEM IN SAID 
CONCLUSION. 
If this Supreme Court holds that all of the defendants 
are barred by limitations, that the statute was neither 
tolled as to any of them, nor avoided by the two dismissal 
rule set up by defendants, then it will be unnecessary to 
consider Points IV and V in this brief. If, however, the 
ruling should be against the plaintiffs on these matters of 
limitation, it will be necessary to determine the interests 
actually held by the defendants. 
Conclusion of Law No. 4, (Record 181-2) awards to 
the Smith defendants "an undivided 11.1 interest in the 
land described in the complaint as against the plaintiffs, 
all and severally, and all persons claiming under them, 
subject to the interest in said land reserved by Maude 
White Waring." There is no conclusion as to the interest 
reserved by Maude White Waring. In the Amended Decree, 
(Record 184) it is decreed that the Smith defendants "are 
the owners in fee simple of an undivided 1/3 interest in the 
land hereinafter described, as against the plaintiffs, all 
and severally, and all persons claiming under them." 
In their answer (Record 14-16), the Smith defendants 
do not make any affirmative allegations as to what interest 
they own in the lands involved in the action. Their entire 
39 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
answer' ·consists' jri' general ~admissions.' and ' denials 'of the 
"complaint.~--: ·No ·counter.;claim isi:. ·a.neged: ··In· their pi·ayer 
·m- ·:said< answe·r, these defendants ... pray that· defendants' 
'~.~title atid 'Ownership in .. ari 'undivided:orte-third (1/a) interest 
in the real property described in the complaint be quieted 
in t~ese defenQants" witho~~ ~ny pleadings upon which to 
,~~~~:,t~i; :rf~~~r.' ·~·· ,r.;, :,r,~; . ., < ~ ', •. , ·.:',; ••. : ... 
. : :):·::::: JJnder ... Rule 8 .(a), Utah ·Rules· of :Civil:Procedure, the 
._Smit:\1:.:defendants are entitled to· no· affirmative relief ·as 
,_prayeJ.for: ln tbeir~·-Answer. ' .. -They have· alieged no facts 
··shqwi:ng -.that.,they= are· ,~entitled to· the affirmative relief 
'·Pf~Y~rLfor •. 
Finding of Fact IV shows: that the' ··slnith '-'defendants 
lWd .1P~. ~r&ffet: de~~J?.<l~n,ts cl_ai:r:n the same 4:lterest, namely 
; .' : ~~- .: • :. J .. •. : -~- . . .. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . 
th~ undi yiqe<I.. lj3 inte.rest w~ich was not cony eyed .. ~way by 
~ .t .: ;; .: . !·, .: . • :· ; ,! : '• •• • . : : . • • •. •. : . :: . • . 
Mar~-~~- ~~~ffet .. ,d~~ng. hi~> life.time._ This finding, further 
. ·: ~: . ;~ ' . :· . : . ,. . . .· . - . . . 
s~~s. fo~~ JP.~~.:Mc;trk.P~ _]~Jr~ftet .conv~yed. ~~divided % 
• •· 'I • • ',, ,:':•• '•••1' '•• . • .. • .. 
inter.est during his lifetime, and_ that his wife, Hannah J. 
·· .. : ':'. ·::.:: )·, .. ':. ,: ' . ' 
Braffet, ·who survived him, did not join in the conveyances. 
··'"·: .. ··.··.. .. . . . .. •' . . . - ... 
(Record 173-17 4) . ~he question .. is then pos.~d: Did the 
--~~~~i~in~:.,lj3 interest descend t~ Han~ah J. Braffet as her 
·1·'· .r;. ~\:: =-~~ · .• •• · • :: · . · 
statutory. ope-thi~d interest, or did the interest descend 
:;:!' . . ·' .: !, :· ,·. 
to the heirs of Mark P. Braffet, deceased, and the subse-
.q~e~t' .Decree of Dlstrib~tion set . forth in .Finding IV . (g) 
(Record 154)---~est the···:tltl~ in .. Maude White? In other 
w·ords, did Maude· White su-cceed to her title as an heir of 
·Mark P. Braffet, or as an ·heir of Hannah J. Braffet? The 
·crux of the argument under this point is as to what interest 
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was conveyed by Maude White, also known as Maude V. 
White, also known as Maude Braffet White, to David G. 
Smith, by the deed set forth in said Finding IV in paragraph 
(i) (Record 154, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, page 205.) 
It is to be noted here that all deeds, instruments and 
proceedings must be taken at their face value as there is 
no testimony to alter or vary the instruments and proceed-
ings. 
At pages 77 to 81 of the record appears the Answer 
of Intervenor, wherein Karl V. King, administrator of the 
Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased sets forth that at the 
time of her death "the said Hannah J. Braffet," "had an 
undivided interest in the real estate described in the com-
plaint and that upon her death her interest descended to 
her heirs subject to being probated." The prayer prayed 
that "defendant's title and ownership in an undivided inter-
est in the real property described in the complaint, as her 
interest may appear, be quieted in the intervenor and this 
defendant.'' The same attorneys represented the Smith 
defendants as represented the Braffet defendants. The 
interest claimed by the Braffet defendants were adverse to 
the interests claimed by the Smith defendants. If Hannah 
J. Braffet had any interest in the property, she took it 
under her statutory one-third allowed by law out of her 
husband's estate, and she had the whole interest. If she 
had this one-third interest, her property succeeded to her 
three children who are named in Finding of Fact IV, para-
graph (h). 
What about the one-third undivided interest? 
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· Hilton ·v. Thatcher, ·;31 Utah, 360, 88 Pac. 20 settles the 
law> as: to :the statutes governing in· the instant case. It 
reads .in :part as follows, at page 22 in the second column: 
.. · . ' 
"It is further conceded that the right of dower is 
:·. · ·· gove~ned by>the.law· in force at·the death of the 
husband· \vhile the measure of the right is deter-
_,,(·l·(i;,,';.:::;·:.·.;' 'mined by·th~·'law 'in.''force. af the time of the }l~s-
band's conveyance where the wife did not relin-
··;:5;,:,.:,."~'.:'~: /~ :'' quisb:· ·her right. · This, beyond ·pera~venture, is 
.. ,· ... the $e,ttl.ed la.w, and w~ s9 hoi~." 
··I·· ,1. __ : "' .• ' • . • . • • 
-~'": · ·In··~othe:r·:words, the>law that· was. applicable to the 
86wer.-:or ·statUtory interest of the widow· on January 2nd, 
1927, the date ofth·e death of Mark P. Braffet, governs this 
interest. Sectiorf 6406:···compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Vol-
ume· 2; page ·1232, was -the governing statute. It reads as 
follows:· .. ::: .. :·· .:.· . 
. ·: ·· -~ · ~ .:~ 6406. (2826). Wife's interest in her husband's 
.·,, .. ·:····· .. ' ... · .. , I . . .. · 
· ; ... ;:· .. ,.~. rea1 property. 'One-third in value of all the legal 
:: .. ·::::~~:;_ ~,;:for: equitable: estates·· in real property possessed ·by 
. · ,. .. : .. the husband. at ~ny time during the marriage,_ 
and to which the Wife has made no relinquishment 
. I . :.··: ·,; ;: •·of her rights, shall be set apart. as her property in 
I . 
·.fee simple if she survive him; provided, that the 
wife. shall not be entitled to any . interest under 
the provisions of this section in any such estate of 
· which the husband has made a conveyance when 
·the wife, at the time of the conveyance, is not 
.. qr never has been a resident of the territory or 
·state of Utah. Property distributed under the 
provisions, of this section ·shall be free from all 
debts of the decedent, except those secured by 
mechanics' or laborers' liens for work or labor 
'done or rna terial furnished exclusively fd'r the 
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improvement of the same, and except those creat-
ed for the purchase thereof, and for taxes levied 
thereon. The value of such part of the home-
stead as may be set aside to the widow shall be 
deducted from the distributive share provided for 
her in this section. In cases wherein only the 
heirs, devisees, and legatees of the decedent are 
interested, the property secured to the widow by 
this section may be set off by the court in due 
process of administration. 
The above statute was formely Section 2826, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1907. Prior to that it was Section 2826, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898. In the Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, it is unchanged as Section 101-4-3. In the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, it is unchanged as Section 101-4-3. 
In the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the section is 74-4-3, 
Volume 8, page 49. 
The original basic case involving the issue before the 
court, namely, the wife's share in the lands of her deceased 
husband conveyed by him during the marriage without her 
consent, is best presented by the case of In re Park's Estate, 
Hilton v. Stewart, 31 Utah, 255, 87 P. 900, 8 L. R. A. (N.S.) 
1101. In that case the wife was attempting to get a money 
judgment against the estate of her deceased husband for a 
one-third of the value of lands conveyed by the husband 
during his lifetime without her consent. The court says, 
at pages 902 and 903: 
Does section 2826 give such a right? We think 
not. Counsel for appellant lays much stress upon 
the wording of that section in that it says "one-
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·j. 
~~ ·· .. :.; 
third· in value" shall be the wife's interest. This 
·of itself added nothing ·at all to her interest. At 
·:common law· all courts in distributing the wife's 
share always sought to fix it as nearly as possible 
fn each ·case at one-third the value, even where 
the same was set off to her in kind. To have 
done· otherwise \Vould' have been a farce not to be 
· tolerated by any court. But the statute does not 
.. ··say that.this one~ third irt value shall be set apart 
to her out of the estate of the husband, but the 
statute says "one-third in value of all the legal or 
equitable ·estates· in ·real property possessed by the 
husband at any· time during the marriage * * * 
shall be set. apart as. her property in fee simple 
ff she survives him." This refers to the land it-
self that was ·possessed by him during the mar-
.·/. ·: riage): not ... to any kind of property that may be 
l~ft . ~y him at . his death constituting his estate. 
Moreover· ·appellant's counsel concedes that the 
law in force at the time of the husband's convey-
ance controls as to the measure of the wife's 
'j r: : ·. · .... -. · · ·.:interest~ If this be· so, in case the law is changed 
;;::; ·.·._!:; ... ; ·:-·.. .after conveyance; .·and before the death of the 
, ... '" husbC1nd, so as to ~nlarge the wife's interest, how 
cari the wife claim the enlarged right against the 
L :I husband's ·estate any more than she could against 
his grantee? 
Under the law as it was at the time of the con-
veyance the husband had a legal as well as a 
. moral right to transfer. his entire interest. This 
interest consisted of the fee to the land, except 
that it was ·encumbered by the inchoate interest 
of the wife. In case she survived him she thus 
had and could have no greater interest in the 
la'nds conveyed by him than the law gave her. 
·'The ·Legislature, by adopting section 2826, could 
· not nor did it attempt to enlarge the widow's in-
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terest in then alienated lands. What could not 
be done directly we do not think can be or was 
contemplated to be done indirectly. But if appel-
lant's contention is sound, the Legislature accom-
plished by indirection what she concedes they 
could not do directly. We cannot yield our assent 
to this contention, but feel constrained to hold 
that the wife, if she desires to recover her inter-
est in her husband's lands alienated by him during 
marriage, without her consent, must resort to the 
lands themselves, and that she can recover such 
interest only as the law gave her at the time the 
lands were aliena ted by the husband. In all lands 
possessed by him at the time of his death, and in 
all that were alienated by him under the law as it 
stood at the time of his death, she takes her 
interest in accordance with that law. It must not 
be overlooked that the inchoate contingent inter-
est of the wife in her husband's lands is in the 
nature of an incumbrance which may or may not 
become an absolute and enforceable right depen-
dent upon the one fact that she survives her 
husband. This incumbrance is against the land, 
and exists against each specific parcel while the 
right remains inchoate. Neither is the right 
changed when it becomes vested and enforceable 
upon the death of the husband, so that it may be 
shifted at the pleasure of the wife from one parcel 
to another, or against one grantee, and not against 
another. THE INTEREST OF THE WIFE IS IN 
THE LAND ITSELF TO BE APPORTIONED TO 
HER ONE-THIRD IN VALUE OUT OF EACH 
PARCEL. (Emphasis ours.) 
The right to an interest exists, if it exists at all, 
by virtue of the law, and not by virtue of contract, 
and hence must be enforced according to the law 
that gives the right to such interest. 
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·From this case, it is noted that where the deceased has 
conveyed 'the property without his wife's consent, that the 
one-third interest of the wife in that property vests immed-
iately upon·the death of her husband in the surviving widow, 
that she must reso~ to the property itself, and in this case, 
where only two-thirds undivided interest in the land was 
alienated·by· the husband, the remaining one-third vests in 
fee. sirnple. in the widow without further proceedings in the 
estate. This interest belongs to her by operation of law 
and· vests a fee simple title in the widow. The estate of the 
hU:s~and. arid the heirs of the deceased have absolutely no 
interest therein. 
The next case is the one which is used in Utah as the 
basic case on the subject. It is the case of In Re Bullen's 
ESta.t~, 47 ·.utah 96, 151 Pac. 533, L.R.A. 1916c, 670. The 
rule is still in effect in Utah and is as follows: 
··That the wife receives under section 2826---one-
~ third in fee simple of all the legal and equitable 
·estate on real property possessed by the husband 
during coverture, and not relinquished by her-
she receives, not as an heir of her husband, but 
in her own right, something which belongs to her 
absolutely, and of which she could not have been 
deprived by will or by any other voluntary act of 
her husband without her consent. Under that 
section, she is not an heir within the meaning of 
our intestate or succession statutes. 
* * * * * 
So here, while under our statute the wife does not 
take as a survivor of community property, she 
nevertheless takes her one-third interest in the 
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husband's real estate in fee simple, just as absolute 
and as much in her own right as does the wife 
take her one-half in community property. In 
neither instance can she be deprived of that right 
by will, or by any other voluntary act of her 
husband without her consent, and neither is her 
interest awarded or acquired by succession, des-
cent, or inheritance. Succession, as defined by 
the statute, "is the coming in of another to take 
the property of one who dies without disposing 
of it by will." That implies that property acquir-
ed by sucession may be disposed of by will. But 
the property which the wife takes under section 
2826 may not be disposed of by will without her 
consent. 
Now, under parts of section 2828 the widow is an 
heir of her husband; when he dies intestate leav-
ing a wife and one child, the estate going one-half 
to her and one-half to the child, and if no issue, 
the whole of the estate, if not over $5,000 in value, 
to her. Thus what goes to her under section 2828, 
over and above her one-third interest granted 
under section 2826, she takes as an heir of her 
husband, for that he may dispose of by will to her 
or to another. That she takes under the intestate 
laws or statutes of inheritance. But that which 
she takes under section 2826 she takes absolutely 
and in her own right, and not by succession or 
inheritance. We think that the fair meaning of 
the statute of succession. 
The case of Jeppson v. Jeppson, 115 Utah, 541; 206 
P.2d 711, states: 
The surviving widow's statutory have been fully 
discussed by this court in several cases, and need 
not be further set out here. See In re Bullen's 
47 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Estate, 47 Utah 96, 151 P. 533, L.R.A. 1916C, 670; 
In re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah 17, 189 P. 409; and 
Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677. 
The law quoted in these three cases above is still in 
force in Utah. 
Great stress was l~id by the Smith defendants, adverse-
ly ·to· the Braffet defendants, upon the "Waiver of Notice 
and Consent to Partial Distribution" signed by Hannah 
B.raffet, and appearing at page 131 of the .kbstract of title, 
~laintiffs' Exhibit C .. The petition for partial distribution 
is set forth at pages 103 to 111 of the said abstract. At 
page 106, the petition reads: 
That your petitioner, believing it to be for the best 
interests OF SAID HEmS and that no one 
INTERESTED IN SAID ESTATE will be preju-
diced by the partial distribution of the property 
of said estate at this time and, each of said HEms 
having consented thereto, as will appear from 
. their written waiver of notice and consent to par-
. tial distribution to be hereafter filed herein, your 
petitioner recommends and prays that the foll-
owing property, now on hand as shown by the 
inventary of said estate and the account filed 
herewith, be distributed in the manner and to 
the persons entitled as follows, to-wit: (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The said waiver at page 131 of the abstract reads: 
The undersigned, BEING AN HEm OF MARK 
P. BRAFFET, DECEASED, hereby waives notice 
of the time and place of hearing of the Adminis-
trator's First Account and Report and Petition for 
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Partial Distribution, copies of which are hereto 
annexed, and consents to the hearing of said 
First Account and Report and Petition for Partial 
Distribution at any time; and the UNDERSIGNED 
HEIR, believing it to be for the best interests of 
all OF THE HEIRS of said deceased and that no 
one INTERESTED IN SAID ESTATE will be pre-
judiced thereby, hereby consents and agrees to 
the manner and mode of partial distribution as 
set forth and as provided for in said annexed 
Petition for Partial Distribution, and further con-
sents and agrees that the property BELONGING 
TO SAID ESTATE, not so distributed, shall re-
main in the estate subject to administration and 
future distribution. And the undersigned further 
certifies that he has read the annexed First 
Account and Report and Petition for Partial Dis-
tribution. 
Dated this 5th day of August, 1927. 
Hannah Braffet 
(Emphasis ours.) 
There is nothing in this waiver and consent which 
refers to any separate property of Hannah Braffet. The 
only property affected is that BELONGING TO THE ES-
TATE and to which Hannah Braffet succeeded as an HEIR. 
There is nothing in the waiver and consent that suggests 
that the property distributed by the court to said Hannah 
Braffet was in lieu of her statutory interest or that it was 
made as a set-off to such interest. 
The Decree of P«!rtial Distribution is shown at pages 
148 to 152 of the abstract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit C). At page 
149 the following statement is made: 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUD·GED AND 
'DECREED that partial distribution OF SAID 
ESTATE be made as follows: to-wit: (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The case of Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 Pac. 677 
~tates at page 680, second column: 
T.his court is, ho:wever, committed to a contrary 
. _doctrine, in that _we have held that under our 
~tatute the widow of a deceased husband does not 
take as an heir .. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah, 
90, 151 Pac. 533, L. R. A. 1916C, 670. It is held 
that a widow ta~es_ her one-third interest in her 
husband's real estate not as an heir, but in her 
own right .. 
This being so, the interest that Hannah Braffet relin-
quished as an heir In the probate proceedings in her hus-
band's estate, had absolutely no effect upon her one-third 
interest which she owned in fee simple by operation of law 
upon her husband's death. · Because of this, Maude White 
received no title by virtue of the Decree of Distribution in 
the Matter of the Estate of Mark P. Braffet, Deceased. The 
estate had no title to distribute. Hannah Braffet, the 
widow, has never relinquished her one-third interest in the 
lands involved in this action which belonged to her in fee 
simple upon the death of her husband. 
Hannah Braffet (or Hannah J. Braffet), the widow of 
Mark P. Braffet, died on or about December 7th, 1938, at 
Price, Utah (Plaintiff's Exhibit C, page 181.) Her estate 
is being probated as No. 1206 in Carbon County, Utah. No 
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distribution in the estate has yet been made, although the 
original administrator was appointed on August 19th, 1940 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit C page 187), but said administrator 
never qualified. Karl V. King is now the duly appointed, 
qualified and acting administrator of her estate, and was 
represented herein by the same attorneys who represent 
the Smith interests. 
Said Hannah J. Braffet left three heirs, namely, Robert 
I. Braffet, Maude White and James H. Braffet. (Finding 
of Fact IV (h) ). Under Section 74-4-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, these heirs succeeded to the title of the one-
third interest vested in the deceased at the time of her 
death. Maude White would have a vested interest of an 
undivided one-ninth in the lands involved in this action, she 
receiving one-third of the one-third fee simple title owned 
by the deceased. In the actions herein involved, Maude 
White (now Maude White Waring) has made no appear-
ances. Karl V. King as the administrator of the Estate of 
Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased, represents her in this action. 
(Section 75-11-5 U.C.A. 1953). 
The above one-ninth interest is all that Maude White 
has ever been vested with in fee simple, as she took no title 
under the Estate of Mark P. Braffet, Deceased. Whatever 
interest the Smith interests have in this action came 
through this one-ninth interest vested in Maude White upon 
the death of her mother, Hannah J. Braffet. 
At page 205 of the abstract of title is shown a Quit-
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Claim Deed from Maude White, also known as Maude V. 
White, also known as Maude Braffet White, being one and 
the same person in her own right, grantor, to David G. 
Smith, grantee, which deed is dated December 4th, 1945, 
and recorded December 19th, 1945, in Book "19" of Deeds, 
at page 492, as Entry No. 76857 of the records of Duchesne 
County, Utah. It is under this deed that the Smith inter-
ests claim all of the title which they have in the property 
involved in this action, and the other prior actions. What 
did this deed convey to David G .Smith? 
As above set forth, Maude White was vested upon the 
death of her mother, Hannah J. Braffet, with an undivided 
one-ninth interest in the property involved in this action. 
She could not convey more than she had. The deed con-
veys: 
All of Section 11, except the Northeast Quarter 
(NE14 of the Northeast Quarter (NE%), of 
Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special 
Meridian. 
Saving and excepting and reserving to the Grant-
or, her heirs, and assigns, out of the grant hereby 
made, a one-sixth (1/6) interest in all oil, gas and 
minerals under said premises hereby conveyed, 
and the right to go upon the said land and drill 
and prospect and remove, by pipe-line or other-
wise, any oil, gas or minerals belonging to the 
Grantor, her administrators, assigns, or executor~: 
In the light of the discussions had above, this convey-
ance would convey an undivided one-ninth interest in the 
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surface rights of the above property, and would reserve 
one-sixth of the oil, gas and minerals in all of the property 
to the grantor. The grantor did not have one-sixth to re-
serve so that she would reserve all that she did have, one-
ninth of such oil, gas and minerals. This one-ninth of the 
minerals would remain in the possession and control of the 
administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased, 
until distribution is made. The appearance of Karl V. King, 
as administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, De-
ceased, would place the interests in the minerals retained 
by Maude White in litigation here, with Karl V. King as 
such administrator representing the Maude White interests. 
The appearance of the Smith interests personally would 
litigate only the one-ninth of the surface conveyed by the 
above Quit-Claim Deed. All of the defendants' claims are 
made by the same attorneys. 
It is interesting to note the Decree entered by this 
Court on September lOth, 1954 as to the interests quieted in 
the various parties. (Record 104-106). In paragraphs 1 and 
3 of the Decree the following appears: 
1. That subject to the interest of Maude White 
Warring, the defendants L .L. Pack, Helen B. 
Mott and W. H. Coltharp and The Continental 
Bank and Trust Company, administrator of the 
estate of David G. Smith, deceased, are the own-
ers in fee simple of an undivided lj3 interest in 
the land hereinafter described, as against the 
plaintiffs all and severally and all persons claim-
ing under them. 
* * * * * 
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· 3. Karl V. King, administrator of the estate of 
Hannah J. Braffet, deceased, is the owner in fee 
simple of an undivided 2/9 interest in the land 
hereinafter described as against the plaintiffs all 
and severally and all persons claiming under them. 
5/9 of the title is quieted in successors in title to Mark 
P. Braffet when he only owned an undivided lj3 interest in 
the property at the time of his death. The same attorneys 
represent a~l answe~ing interests. They have prepared a 
Decree which in effect says that Hannah J. Braffet at the 
time of her death was vested with a fee simple to an un-
divided one-third of the property involved in this action. 
They then say in the Decree which they prepared that when 
Maude Wpite, one of the heirs of Hannah J. Braffet, con-
veyed her interest as an heir of Hannah J. Braffet, deceased, 
she conveyed a one-third interest in the proprty when she 
could not have inherited more than one-ninth thereof. 
In construing the deed from Maude White to David G. 
Smith set forth above, there is no evidence in the record to 
show an intent of the parties in the execution of this deed. 
The deed must be taken at its face value. 
The deed conveys all of the land and reserves "one-sixth 
(1/6) interest in ALL oil, gas and mineral under said prem-
ises hereby conveyed" (Emphasis ours.) The grantor, no 
doubt, thought that she had a one-third interest in the 
land and was reserving one-half of the oil, gas and minerals 
which she supposedly owned. Whatever she thought does 
not change or alter the interest which she actually had in 
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the property. What she actually owned and reserved is 
still her property. She therefore, as an heir of Hannah J. 
Braffet, deceased, is vested with an undivided one-ninth of 
the oil, gas and minerals in the lands involved in this action, 
subject to probating, and subject to the rights of the plain-
tiffs herein. 
At pages 254 and 255 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit C) is shown a Quit-Claim Deed from David G. Smith 
and Juanita C. Smith, his wife, to Helen B. Mott, dated 
February 1st, 1950, and recorded April 25th, 1950, in Book 
"24" of Deeds, pages 83-84, as Entry No. 87 490 of the re-
cords of Duchesne County, Utah. This deed purports to con-
vey an undivided one-fourth interest in the entire property 
involved in this action. Inasmuch as David G. Smith was 
vested with an undivided one-ninth of the surface at the 
time of the execution of this deed, all of his interest passed 
to said Helen B. Mott. He, and The Continental Bank and 
Trust Company, administrator of the Estate of David G. 
Smith, Deceased, and Juanita C. Smith, widow of deceased 
David G. Smith, had no interest in the property at the time 
of the commencement of this action. 
At page 256 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
C) is shown a Quit-Claim Deed from David G. Smith and 
Juanita C. Smith, his wife, to W. H. Coltharp, dated Febru-
ary 1st, 1950 and recorded May 3rd, 1950, in Book "9" of 
Mining Records, page 132, as Entry No. 87621 of the records 
of Duchesne County, Utah. While this deed was executed 
the same day as the deed to Helen B. Mott above, there is 
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no evidence in the record that Helen B. Mott had any actual 
notice of the execution of this second deed which was not 
recorded for some time after the deed to Helen B. Mott 
was recorded. Helen B. Mott, having succeeded to all of 
the title of David G. Smith, William H. Coltharp took no 
interest by his deed, and the defendants, W. H. Coltharp and 
Oral Coltharp had no right, title or interest in the lands 
involved in this action at the time of the commencement of 
the action. 
At page 257 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
C) is shown a Quit-Claim Deed from David G. Smith and 
Juanita C. Smith, his wife, to L. L. Pack, dated February 
1st, 1950, and recorded May lOth, 1950, in Book "9" of Min-
ing Records, page 175, as Entry No. 87685 of said County 
Records. The same facts govern as are set forth above. L. 
L. Pack and Nora E. Pack, his wife, had no right, title or 
interest in the lands involved in this action at the time of 
the commencement of this action. 
Therefore, even though this Supreme Court should 
hold that the Smith defendants are entitled to recover, the 
only interest that it would affect would be an undivided 
one-ninth interest in the surface rights. That is all of the 
title they can show by the findings of fact and documentary 
evidence introduced in evidence. This interest is subject to 
probating in the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, deceased. 
POINT V. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 6 IS CONTRARY TO 
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AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE 
LAW. 
The argument for this point is the same as that for 
Point N, as far as it goes. The same attorneys represented 
all defendants, even though the interests of the Smith de-
fendants and Braffet defendants were adverse. As set forth 
under Point IV, anything the Smith defendants get is by 
succession through Hannah J. Braffet, deceased. Section 
74-4-2 U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"74-4-2. PROPERTY OF INTESTATE 
PASSES SUBJECT TO PROBATE PROCEED-
INGS.-The property, both real and personal, of 
• one who d!les without disposing of it by will pass-
es to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the con-
trol of the court, and to the possession of any 
administrator appointed by the court for the 
purposes of administration.'' 
Section 75-11-4, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"75-11-4. POSSESSION OF REPRESENT-
V ATIVE POSSESSION OF HEIRS AND DE-
VISEES.-For the purpose of bringing suits to 
quiet title, or for partition of the estate, the poss-
ession of the executors or administrators is the 
possession of the heirs or devisees; such possession 
by the heirs or devisees is subject, however, to 
the possession of the executor or administrator 
for the purposes of administration as provided in 
this title." 
When the attorney for all defendants filed the Answer 
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of Intervenor (Record 77-81) of Karl V. King, administrator 
of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased, the entire 
interest owned by Hannah J. Braffet at the time of her 
death was being litigated by said administrator. This ac-
tion is a possessory action. Finding of Fact No. II (Record 
173) finds that Karl V. King is the duly appointed, qualified 
and acting administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, 
deceased. Karl V. King, as such administrator, has the 
right of possession to any interest in and to the property 
involved in this action, owned by Hannah J. Braffet at the 
time of her death. The Smith defendants claim under 
Maude V. White (Waring), and her only interest was as an 
heir of Hannah J. Braffet deceased. Therefore, Karl V. 
King, as such administrator, has the right of possession to 
any interest ~he _Smith defendants may claim in this action. 
In withdrawing ·as counsel-for Karl V. King, administrator, 
(Record 114)" the same counsel for the Smith defendants 
cannot now say that he has not withdrawn as counsel for 
same interests which are now claimed by the Smith defend-
ants adversely to the said administrator. Karl V. King, ad-
ministrator, is in default. The record shows that subject 
to the tax sale and before her death, Hannah J. Braffet was 
vested with the one-third interest she took upon the death 
of her husband. Because of the default of such adminis-
trator, plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quieting their title 
to an undivided one-third interest in the property involved 
in this action, said interest to include any rights claimed 
by the Smith and Braffet defendants. This would apply 
even though the Smith defendants are not barred by limi-
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tations, which plaintiffs do not admit. 
Conclusion of Law No. 6 should be set aside and a new 
conclusion made setting forth that the plaintiffs are entitled 
to a decree quieting their title as to this one-third interest. 
POINT VI. 
THE AMENDED DE·CREE IS CONTRARY TO AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE LAW. 
Plaintiffs most strongly urge that the argument pre-
sented heretofore in this brief has shown that all of the con-
clusions of law (Record 181-183) are not suported by the 
findings of fact and the documentary evidence on file, and 
that all of them are in error in applying the law to the facts 
found. Plaintiffs urge that they are entitled to have this 
Supreme Court withdraw all of the conclusions of law on 
the grounds herein set forth, and order new conclusions 
made to conform to the arguments hereinbefore presented. 
Under these circumstances, the Amended Decree should be 
reversed and judgment given to plaintiffs. 
POINT VII. 
FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE DOCUMEN-
TARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE LAW, THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO 
A DECREE QUIETING THEIR TITLE AS AGAINST ALL 
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Plaintiffs claim that the amended findings of fact 
(Record 171-180). ~how that the plaintiffs are entitled to a 
gecree quieting their title as against all of the respondents. 
Pla~nt~ffs filed proposed findings of fact (Record 151-160) 
which are nearly identical with the Amended Findings of 
Fact (Record 171-180). Plaintiffs most strongly urge that 
applying the Jaw hereinbefore set forth to these findings of 
fact, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree quieting 
their title. 
The basis of the plaint~ffs title is set forth in finding 
of fact No. 5 (Record 176)._ The validity and regularity of 
the instruments set forth in said finding is nowhere ques· 
tioned. Pla\ntiffs' Exhibit ~ is a certified copy of the 
Auditor's Tax D~ed and is regular on its face in every re-
spect. Under the ruling of this Supreme Court in Hansen 
v. Morris, supra, plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quiet-
ing their title in the premises against all of the respondents. 
CONCLUSION. 
The plaintiffs and appellants have proved their case. 
They are entitled to a Decree quieting their title on the 
record on appeal. 
Karl V. King, administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. 
Braffet, Deceased, the claimant of an undivided one-third 
interest in the property, is in default. He represents any 
interest claimed by the so-called Smith defendants. 
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(1) They are barred by the provisions of Chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah, 1951. 
(2) They did not plead in their answer any affirma-
tive allegations which would avoid the bar of the statute of 
limitations. 
(3) Civil Action No. 2693 tolled the statute of limita-
tions only for the purpose of that particular action, and did 
not toll said statute as to the present action. 
(4) The answer filed by said defendants did not make 
any allegations for any affirmative relief. 
The so-called Zane defendants are barred by the pro-
visions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951. The orders dis-
missing the various actions, all signed by Judge R. L. 
Tuckett, did not constitute an adjudication on the merits. 
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